Comparative advantage in Philippines rice production by Kempis, Roy S
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN PHILIPPINES
RICE PRODUCTION
by
ROY S. KEMPIS
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Agricultural Development Economics 
in the Australian National University
July 1983
D E C L A R A T I O N
E xcep t where o th e r w i s e  i n d i c a t e d ,  t h i s  
s u b - t h e s i s  i s  my own work.
J u l y  1983
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to both the Governments of the Republic of the 
Philippines and of the Commonwealth of Australia for granting me the 
Colombo Plan Scholarship Award to undertake the course leading to the 
degree of Master of Agricultural Development Economics at the 
Australian National University.
I am indebted to my supervisors, Professor Emeritus Heinze W. 
Arndt of the ASEAN - Australia Research Project, Research School of 
Pacific Studies (RSPacS) and Dr. Sisira Jayasuriya, of the Economics 
Department, RSPacS for their valuable suggestions, comments and 
criticisms and for their patience with me all the way through while 
this sub-thesis was in preparation.
I am grateful to Dr. D.P. Chaudri of the Development Studies 
Centre (DSC) for providing me with help relating to his position as 
Director of the M.A.D.E. Program.
I am very thankful to Dr. Rodney Tyers of the ASEAN - Australia 
Research Project, and Mr. Ken Sawers of the DSC, with whom I had 
sought guidance in the early stages of my work. Their support also 
enabled me to improve the analysis and discussion of the results.
I am much indebted to the Pampanga Agricultural College 
(Philippines) thru Dr. F.A. Battad, President, for granting me the 
permission to study and leave the office for a considerable length of 
time.
iii
I am also thankful to Ms. Dawn Beresford-Wylie of the Australian 
Development Assistance Bureau for her guidance on administrative 
matters, and also to Mr. C. Blunt from whom I had help in editing 
the manuscript.
I am also indebted to Mr. C. Olalo, Mrs. C.P. Diaz and her 
friend Nancy of the Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines for providing 
me the data on which this sub-thesis is mostly based.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Ernie, my young children Emil 
Roy and Kevin Ray and all the members of my family who were the source 
of my inspiration and moral support during my two years of 
post-graduate work at the Australian National University.
ROY S. KEMPIS 
July 1983
iv
ABSTRACT
This study is an examination of the existence of comparative 
advantage in rice production in the Philippines and related policy 
issues .
The analysis and evaluation focused on the assessment of the net 
effect of government rice policies and on whether the country enjoyed 
a natural comparative advantage in rice production during the period 
1978 to 1981. This analysis was extended to include competing crops, 
i.e., corn and sugar, in order to compare their relative merits. To 
measure the degree of comparative advantage, the study made use of 
measures of private profitability, net social profitability (NSP), and 
domestic resource cost (DRC). Effective rates of protection (ERP's) 
were also calculated for these crops.
The results indicate that, in general, government policies have 
been biased against agriculture. Within the agricultural sector, in 
relative terms the net effect of these policies have favoured rice and 
corn production while they discriminated against sugar production.
The results show that the Philippines had a comparative 
advantage in rice production between 1978 and 1981. The degree of 
comparative advantage in rice was found to be very sensitive to world 
rice prices.
Expanding the area under irrigation appears to be only marginally 
socially profitable and increasing irrigation investment needs careful 
reappraisal. If farmers have to bear the full cost of irrigation they
v
may be reluctant to shift from rainfed to irrigated production 
conditions because their private profits could be reduced.
At current yields, expanding corn production at the expense of rice
production does not appear to be profitable. Sugar may be more competitive
at world prices, but rice is still the most desirable crop to produce at 
domestic prices.
In the context of technology choice, the recommended rice technology, 
while socially more profitable, is less privately profitable than the 
farmers' "average" technology. This probably explains why farmers are 
reluctant to adopt the full recommended rice technology package.
Finally, technical change has been an important factor which 
enabled the Philippines to retain a comparative advantage in rice 
production. Thus, continuing technical change would be crucial to 
sustain this advantage. Investment in research which increases yields 
have been shown to have a high pay off, and this may be an area for 
more government investment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Importance of the Rice Industry
The Philippine economy is predominantly agriculture-based. 
Approximately 70 percent of total population, who are dependent on 
farming as a means of livelihood, are in the rural areas. Agriculture 
in which an approximate 50 percent of the labour force is employed is 
a major contributor to aggregate output and employment (David, 1982). 
Between 1955 and 1980, agriculture's share in net domestic production 
averaged 33 percent per annum; and about 74 percent of the country's 
exports come from agriculture.
Despite these facts, agriculture was actually neglected when 
industrialization was adopted as the overall development strategy. 
When industrialization did not stimulate a faster economic growth in 
the 1960's (Power, et.al., 1971, and; ILO, 1976), agriculture gained 
importance again. The government focused its attention to secure food 
self-sufficiency, the highest priority being given to rice. This 
change in orientation was motivated specifically by at least two 
factors. First, the country had a worsening food deficit and increasing 
rice imports aggravated balance of payments problems. Second, with the 
experience of the green revolution, the development of the "miracle" 
rice varieties renewed expectations that the country could become 
self-sufficient. High yields from modern rice varieties meant a boost
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to incomes of producers. Rice is the staple food, eaten daily by 80 
percent of the population and contributes a major proportion of the 
household consumption basket; greater food availability meant lower 
food prices to consumers. Since rice is a major wage good there was 
potential for maintaining low wage rates facilitating industrial 
development.
1.2 Rice Policies
Rice policies evolved with the intention of achieving different, 
but often conflicting, objectives of self-sufficiency, lower consumer 
prices, stable prices, high farm incomes, more government revenues, 
etc. The long-term investment made by the government to achieve 
self-sufficiency was the improvement and establishment of physical 
infrastructure and institutional facilities like irrigation and research- 
extension systems. During the 1970's price support and credit schemes 
as well as a fertilizer subsidy were added. In the early 1970's consumers 
enjoyed subsidized rice prices through government controls when supplies 
were low both in domestic and world markets. Thereafter control of 
prices continued through price ceilings and complemented by imports when 
necessary. However, the government attempted to maintain price 
incentives to producers to stimulate growth in output. Thus, the twin 
goals of good prices for the producers and consumers were apparently 
satisfied.
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A f t e r  1977 t h e  c o u n t r y  e l i m i n a t e d  im p o r t s  a v e r a g i n g  seven  p e r c e n t  
o f  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  a n n u a l l y  be tw een  1970 and 1977 . I n  1977 the  
c o u n t r y  became a n e t  e x p o r t e r  o f  r i c e .  By 198 0 /8 1 ,  t h e  government  
p a id  premiums of  P0.07 p e r  k i l o g r a m  of  e x p o r t  q u a l i t y  paddy s o l d  by 
f a r m e r s  to  the  go v e rn m e n t .  Domes t ic  r i c e  p r i c e s  have been  h i g h e r  t han  
w or ld  (and e x p o r t )  p r i c e s  s i n c e  1979 be c ause  of  c o n t i n u e d  government  
p r i c e  s u p p o r t .
1 .3  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  Study
A f r e e - t r a d e  p o l i c y  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  i s  
b e l i e v e d  by many e c o n o m i s t s  to  p r o v i d e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l s  of  economic 
w e l f a r e  f o r  s m a l l  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  no m arke t  power i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d i n g .  However ,  such  a c om p le te  f r e e - t r a d e  p o l i c y  i s  r a r e l y  found 
i n  p r a c t i c e .  Almost  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  a dop t  t r a d e  reg im es  which  i n v o l v e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  of  v a r i o u s  k i n d s .  For  example some c o u n t r i e s  adop t  
p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e i r  d r i v e  t o  r e p l a c e  i m p o r t s  ; o t h e r s  
promote  e x p o r t s ,  and some combine b o t h  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s .  These c a s e s  
o c c u r  when c o u n t r i e s  f a c e  d i f f e r e n t  p r i o r i t i e s ,  f a c t o r  endowments ,  and 
p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and economic c o n d i t i o n s .
T h i s  s t u d y  i s  i n t e n d e d  to  a n a l y z e  t h e  g e n e r a l  impac t  o f  t h e s e  
numerous forms o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h o s e  d e s ig n e d  to  p r o v i d e  s o c i a l  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  s ave  f o r e i g n  exchange  d u r i n g  t h e  im p o r t  y e a r s ,  and 
t h e r e a f t e r ,  t o  e a r n  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e .  Th is  s t u d y  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h e  
above  schemes a d o p te d  by t h e  government  were n o t  c o s t l e s s ,  e s p e c i a l l y
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to society. Aside from incurring the direct cost of implementing the 
various rice policies, there could also be even more important 
indirect ones. The mixture of policies mentioned in Section 1.2 may 
have encouraged resource misallocation in the economy perhaps leading 
to, for example, the proliferation of inefficient producers in the 
rice industry.
The fundamental proposition that this study will examine is:
whether the net effect of rice price policies followed 
during this period have conformed with the country's
comparative advantage as determined by its relative 
factor endowment.
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1.4  O b j e c t i v e s  and Scope of  t h e  S tudy
The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  s t u d y  f o l l o w  from t h e  above p r o p o s i t i o n .
These i n v o l v e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  and e v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
( 1 )  s o c i a l  c o s t s  o f  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e  r i c e  
i n d u s t r y  i n  the  d r i v e  to  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n ,
( 2 )  d i f f e r e n t i a l  n a t u r e  of  i n c e n t i v e s  to  a l t e r n a t i v e  avenues  of  
r e s o u r c e  use such as  p l a n t i n g  o t h e r  c r o p s  ( s u g a r  cane and c o r n ) ,  and
( 3 )  r i c e  e x p o r t  p e r f o r m a n c e .
The s t u d y  c o n c lu d e s  w i t h  p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s .
The f i r s t  o b j e c t i v e  a t t e m p t s  to  a s s e s s  and e v a l u a t e  the  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be tw een  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  d o m e s t i c  r i c e  p r o d u c t i o n .  A 
c r u c i a l  p a r t  of  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of  
m ea s u res  of  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n ta g e  to  changes  i n  economic v a r i a b l e s .  
Th is  e x a m i n a t i o n  sho u ld  be a b l e  to  i d e n t i f y  w h e th e r  t h e r e  i s  e v id e n c e  
t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  has  a c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n ta g e  i n  d o m e s t i c  r i c e  
p r o d u c t i o n  and w h e th e r  i n c r e a s i n g  r i c e  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e f f i c i e n t .
The second o b j e c t i v e  a n a l y z e s  t h e  im pac t  o f  government  p o l i c i e s  
on corn  and s u g a r ,  and compares t h e i r  d e g r e e s  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n ta g e  
w i t h  t h o s e  of t h e  r i c e  i n d u s t r y .  The t h i r d  o b j e c t i v e  c o n c e r n s  t h e  
e x p o r t  p e r f o r m a n c e  of t h e  r i c e  i n d u s t r y .  S ince  t h e  c o u n t r y  became a 
n e t  r i c e  e x p o r t e r ,  e x c e s s  s t o c k s  have been  d i s p o s e d  o f  a t  a f i n a n c i a l  
l o s s  to  the  g o v e rn m e n t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  an  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  e x p o r t  p o l i c i e s  
would be h e l p f u l  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  c h o i c e  of  f u t u r e  p o l i c i e s .
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Finally, the study concludes with a discussion of the economic 
rationality of alternative policies for increasing rice production, 
first to achieve self-sufficiency, and second, to export in order to 
earn foreign exchange. Within the limits of the study, some of these 
policy issues will be investigated.
The study applies the theories and arguments regarding
comparative advantage, effective protection, and domestic resource 
cost provided by trade theorists such as Chenery (1961), Bruno (1962 
and 1972), Balassa (1968), Corden (1966), and Pearson et al. (1976).
The study has six chapters. In Chapter 2, there is a discussion 
of the theoretical basis of analyzing the interrelationships between 
the impact of government intervention and the country’s comparative 
advantage. It is followed in Chapter 3 by a discussion of the impact 
of government policy on the rice industry. This provides information 
on the protective structure in the Philippines and has suplementary 
information on economic indicators of possible sources of the 
Philippines' comparative advantage in increasing rice production.
Chapter 4 contains the methodology for measuring the impact of 
government policies in the use of national resources by the rice 
industry. Chapter 5 contains the results of these estimations which 
further include the analysis on the relative performance of known 
rice substitutes (corn and sugar as competitors), while Chapter 6 
summarizes and concludes the findings of the study.
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Chapter 2
The Theory of Comparative Advantage, Effective Protection and 
Domestic Resource Cost: A Review
2.1 Comparative Advantage and Agricultural Development
The standard approach in the study of the principle of comparative 
advantage in development economies and international economics is to
analyze whether some degree of relative efficiency in the performance 
of a particular economic activity exists in a certain country. By 
definition, a country has a comparative advantage in producing a good 
if the opportunity cost of producing the good is lower at home than in 
other countries (Chenery, 1961). In the analysis of resource allocation, 
the implications of the theory of comparative advantage are derived 
from international trade theory while its critics base their analysis 
on various growth theories .
Classical trade theory postulates that differences in relative 
cost of production (using one mobile factor only, i.e., labour) 
among countries determine production, and direction of trade (Ricardo 
in Johnson, 1968, Freeman, 1971, and Sodersten, 1980).
In contrast with classical theory, the contemporary trade 
theory using the two sector model attempts to show how 
prices are determined and why intercountry price differences might 
arise. Essentially, this is an application of static general
7
equilibrium theory which is a concept of balance among interdependent 
economic forces. A price change in one commodity engenders variations 
in factor proportions, factor prices, and quantities of output as well 
as product prices resulting in adjustments. However, equilibrium, in 
theory tends eventually to be restored. The contemporary version 
focuses on the determination of an optimum pattern of production and 
trade through a comparison of the opportunity cost of producing a 
given commodity with the price at which the commodity can be imported 
or exported.
The Heckscher-Ohlin doctrine of comparative advantage is 
the basis of standard treatment of international trade. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states that a country will benefit from 
trade by producing commodities that use more of its relatively 
abundant factor (Caves, 1960, and Caves and Jones, 1977). This 
version, using two mobile factors of production, labour and 
capital, suggests that those countries relatively rich in capital 
will export capital-intensive goods, and countries that have 
elatively more labour will export labour-intensive goods.
However, there are arguments against production specialisation 
along Heckscher-Ohlin lines. One of these comes from growth theorists. 
This is on the issue of static general equilibrium which 
forms part of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. According to these 
critics, static and pure general equilibrium are actually
never completely attained in an economy because of changes in consumer 
demands and propensities to spend, save, and invest, new technological 
developments, shifting competitive relationships, depletion of
8
existing resources, and discovery of new ones. The modern theories of 
growth emphasize the importance of the interaction over time among 
producers, consumers, and investors in interrelated sectors of the 
economy. There is also importance attached to the sequence of 
production and factor use by sector (sectoral transformation) rather 
than on conditions of general equilibrium alone (Lewis, 1954; Rostow,
1956, and; Johnson and Mellor, 1961).
Critics within the field of international trade also emphasize 
the limitations of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. For instance, according 
to Johnson (1968) the model is restrictive in nature, in view of its 
assumptions, namely: (1) similar production functions between
countries, and (2) immobile factor endowments, are at variance with 
empirical observations like: (1) international mobility of capital,
economies of scale, and differences in technology, (2) "brain drain" 
or the issue of international movement of labour, and (3) "technology 
gap" between countries.
Foremost, the two-factor model is inadequate in applications to 
agriculture because as Johnson (1968) also suggested it misses out a 
third factor, i.e., land, which has been defined as a natural resource.
It is necessary to include land as the third factor since it is land 
from which agricultural production largely comes. Jones (1971) 
developed a three-factor model emphasizing the importance of specific 
factors such as land. His model assumed that agriculture and manufacturing 
use two inputs, one specific to each sector (i.e. land for agriculture and 
capital for manufacturing) and one (i.e. labour) common to both. Anderson
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(1980) a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  u s u a l  t w o - s e c t o r  H e c k s c h e r - O h l i n  a s s u m p t i o n s  
may n o t  a p p l y  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  T h ese  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  l i m i t e d  
c a p i t a l  ( i n c l u d i n g  k n o w led g e  a n d  s k i l l s )  a n d  wage r a t e s  i n  t h e  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  a r e  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  d e t e r m i n e d  by  p e r  w o r k e r  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d  endow m ent.  I n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  in c o m e s  
g row  an d  c a p i t a l  i s  a c c u m u l a t e d  p r o v i d i n g  r e s o u r c e s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  an d  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p r o d u c t i o n .  L ab o u r  w i l l  be a t t r a c t e d  
t o  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r  w h ich  w i l l  e x p a n d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r .  M o re o v e r ,  f o r  an y  g i v e n  l e v e l  o f  c a p i t a l  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  p e r  w o r k e r ,  t h e  r a t e  by w h ic h  l a b o u r  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  
t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r  w o u ld  b e  f a s t e r ,  t h e  lo w e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  wage 
r a t e ,  o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d  endow ment p e r  w o r k e r .  The t h r e e  p r i m a r y  
i n p u t s  i n  A n d e r s o n 's  m odel w i l l  a lw a y s  a f f e c t  t h e  two s e c t o r s  by 
a l l o w i n g  (1) c a p i t a l  t o  be m o b i le  w i t h i n  t h e  two s e c t o r s ,  a n d  (2) 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d  endow m ent t o  a f f e c t  l a b o u r  m o b i l i t y  b e tw e e n  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r s .
T h i s  r e c e n t  v e r s i o n  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
i n i t i a l l y  c o u n t r i e s  r i c h  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  e x p o r t  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  a n d  i m p o r t  m a n u f a c t u r e d  g o o d s .  W ith  c a p i t a l  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  a n d  c o n s t a n t  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e ,  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  g r a d u a l l y  
s h i f t  from  b e i n g  a n e t  e x p o r t e r  o f  r e s o u r c e - b a s e d  p r o d u c t s  t o  b e i n g  
a  n e t  e x p o r t e r  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e s .  The h i g h e r  t h e  endow ment o f  l a n d  o r  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  i s  t h e  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  
f o r  t h e  s h i f t .  The m odel i s  e x t e n d e d  t o  a l l o w  f o r  (1) o t h e r  p r i m a r y  
p r o d u c t i o n  l i k e  m in in g  c a n  t a k e  p l a c e  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  co m p e te  w i t h  
a g r i c u l t u r e  f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  l a n d  an d  c a p i t a l ,  (2) n o n - t r a d a b l e  g o o d s
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and services are produced, and (3) the influence of demand and 
comparative growth factors. The first and last additions are
significant to the agricultural sector of developing countries. The 
first one suggests that even resource-rich developing countries can 
lose comparative advantage vis-a-vis resource-rich developed countries 
in agricultural production if substitution of mining for agriculture 
occurs to a substantial degree. However, productivity of labour and 
land in agriculture can be improved with capital, 
situation in most countries is that agricultural producers have 
acquired sophisticated knowledge (capital) in the use of appropriate 
technology thus verifying this postulate. The last extension
emphasizes that production and trade specialization depend not only on 
supply factors but also on factors like population growth and growth in 
per capita income which affect demand.
In summary, the implications of the importance of the factor land
in agriculture are, (1) a country's comparative advantage in
agriculture will be less the lower its endowment of agricultural land 
relative to say, mineral resources and non-farm capital , and (2)
newly-industrializing resource-poor countries will have a faster rate 
of growth of imports of food and agricultural raw materials for 
labour-intensive manufacturing, the faster their industrialization. 
Moreover, resource-rich developed countries including those with high 
per capita incomes will strengthen their comparative advantage in
primary products through periods when their industrial activity and 
incomes are growing less rapidly than in other resource-poor
countries.
11
Anderson’s theory with its extensions however, has a short-coming 
because it still contains the basic limitation of the modern version 
which was first observed by Naya (1967). This is the prevalence of 
factor-intensity reversals brought about by the substitutability of 
inputs in agriculture (higher than in industry). However, it would be 
difficult to rectify this problem because substitution parameters are 
not available. The bias is recognized and known but generally its 
extent is not.
The three-factor model of the theory using its more relevant
aspects can provide useful analytical results. For instance,
countries can continue to have comparative advantage in agricultural 
production, given an immobile factor like land. The soil, climatic 
conditions and past investment in agricultural research determine the 
size and shape of the production possibility surface in a given 
region. These together with favourable demand conditions, will
determine relative prices and the most profitable output bundle to 
produce (Thompson, 1980).
Recent studies suggest that comparative advantage can be 
enhanced if dynamic interactions in world trade are adaptable to 
a country's policy orientation through export promotion (Kreuger,
1981). There is no a priori reason why benefits from export 
promotion can outweigh the gains from import-substitution. 
However, empirical research in recent years shows that benefits from 
an outward looking economy (or industry) do not only include widening 
the country's foreign income stream (capital accumulation and savings)
12
but also technical and innovative means of increasing aggregate 
output (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1979, and Kreuger, 1981).
Proponents of import substitution policies disagree. They have 
appealed to "dynamic" considerations of national priorities, 
economic conditions, differences in factor endowments, and infant 
industry considerations for departing from free or first-best 
static trade policies.
2.2 Demand and Supply of Protection
One of the common demands for protection or assistance to 
industries in developing countries has been the so-called 
infant-industry argument. Newly established industries would 
usually seek some tax incentives either through non-payment of 
taxes over a period of time, or in the case of an industry using 
some import components, exemption from duties or, for new import- 
competing industries, direct subsidies. Protection has been 
through imposition of tariffs or quotas on competing imports.
In practice, however, long-established industries were subjected to 
government intervention not only to maintain viability but quite often 
also when social dissatisfaction over the government's treatment of 
primary cost items (e.g. food) imperils political and economic 
well-being of a developing country (Mangahas, 1975). Food security 
gets high priority in many developing countries including the 
Philippines. Some externalities connected with domestic production and 
marketing of an importable or exportable may be present and so an 
intervention close to the point of the distortive effects may be
13
necessary.
Protection seems to strengthen an industry and can provide a 
valuable contribution to the welfare of the community immediately 
affected. Some interpret this support as facilitating income 
generation and distribution (Anderson, 1978); but the latter is
difficult to achieve in developing countries. Related to this,
whereas setting up or promoting an industry can secure jobs, a liberal 
trade policy that provides imports some margin to compete with local 
products might induce at least short-term unemployment.
Another case for tariffs is that of protecting an industry to 
counterbalance adverse consequences of assistance to other industries. 
This is an example of government intervention in developed countries 
that is distortionary in itself because losses generally exceed gains 
to those who benefit from compensation. By contrast, there may be no 
such compensation paid in developing countries because it is difficult 
to implement. The mechanisms to redistribute the new benefits are 
rather weak or non-existent. Whatever the income distribution 
consequences, the government is likely to provide assistance based on 
some perceived benefits (especially to itself). One of these is its 
being retained in power. However, governments also try to intervene 
if it senses fulfilment of political commitments and is able to 
provide social satisfaction.
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2 . 3  The T h e o r y  o f  P r o t e c t i o n
The t h e o r y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  h a s  made c o n s i d e r a b l e  a d v a n c e s ,  b o t h  i n  
n o r m a t i v e  a n d  p o s i t i v e  e c o n o m i c s  (C o r d e n ,  1 9 6 6 ,  and  1 9 7 1 ) ,  The l a t t e r  
f i e l d  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  how t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  n o m i n a l  t a r i f f s  a f f e c t s  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  p a t t e r n  o f  a 
c o u n t r y  ( G r u b e l ,  1 9 7 1 ) .  As a  p r o t e c t i o n  m e a s u r e ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a. 
t a r i f f  i s  t o  r a i s e  t h e  c o s t  o f  i m p o r t s .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  
f o r  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  an  i m p o r t a b l e  i s  l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e .  When 
p r o t e c t i o n  i s  n o t  p r o h i b i t i v e ,  . f o r  a s m a l l  c o u n t r y  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
p r i c e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e s  i s  e q u a l  
t o  t h e  t a r i f f  w h i c h  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  h e r e  a s  n o m i n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  ( t h r o u g h  
t a r i f f s ) .  However ,  i m p o r t s  t h a t  a r e  u s e d  a s  i n p u t s  a r e  a l s o  l i k e l y  
t o  o f f s e t  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n  b e c a u s e  t a r i f f s  a l s o  
r a i s e  t h e  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .
D o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s  ca n  a l s o  be  p r o t e c t e d  i n  a v a r i e t y  o f  ways 
n o t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t a r i f f s ,  e . g .  q u a n t i t a t i v e  c o n t r o l s  
on i m p o r t s  l i k e  q u o t a s .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  c o n t r o l s  on 
i m p o r t s ,  n o m i n a l  t a r i f f  r a t e s  u n d e r s t a t e  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  
T h u s ,  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  e f f e c t i v e  r a t e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  was d e v e l o p e d  t o  
a s s e s s  more  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  s i n c e  d e c i s i o n s  
w e r e  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  a c t i v i t y  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  p r o d u c t  i t s e l f  ( J o h n s o n ,  1 9 6 5 ;  B a l a s s a ,  1968 an d  1971 ;  
G r u b e l ,  1 9 7 1 ;  R u f f i n ,  1 971 ,  and W i l k i n s o n ,  1 9 7 1 ) ,
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An industry’s ERP is defined as the overall proportion by which 
that industry’s value-added (gross value of the industry’s production 
less costs of materials used) is raised by protection of that industry 
and lowered by taxes and protection to other industries (Corden, 
1971). It shows how the overall protection structure discriminates 
between industries. And generally, those industries which require 
higher protection to compete with other industries either at home or 
abroad use national resources less efficiently. If industries were 
equally protected this would mean assisting none of them at all, hence 
it is important to know the structure of ERP's in an economy for 
useful implications to be drawn.
One of the important purposes of the development of ERP however, 
was to use the "price" of value-added to predict output and factor 
allocation at the margin under partial equilibrium conditions (Corden, 
1966; Ethier, 1971, and Humphrey, 1971).
The theory,however, is constrained by its fixed physical-input 
coefficient assumption. When the tariff structure changes, price 
relationships change and induce substitution among inputs, then the 
ERP estimates have a bias which overstates the effective rates 
(Corden, 1966). Travis (1968) cited Balassa (1965) and Basevi (1966) 
who argued that the overestimation of ERP under that assumption can 
explain the divergence between nominal and effective rates to some 
extent. Pursuing these implications Anderson and Naya (1969) analyzed 
the bias in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
function analysis and concluded that arriving at the true ERP is
16
difficult because substitution parameters are usually not available.
Moreover, the theory of effective protection under the above 
assumption was unable (1) to predict the direction in which a tariff 
change reallocates domestic resources, and (2) to rank industries by 
comparative advantage or relative international efficiency.
In the light of these problems nominal and effective rates of 
protection broadly indicate the differential nature of incentives that 
the combination of tariffs, trade policies, and domestic subsidies and 
taxes create in the economy. Grubel (1971) summarizes NRP and ERP 
relationships showing first, that for any given nominal tariff, ERP is 
greater the smaller the value-added of a process. Second, ERP is an 
increasing function of output tariffs and a decreasing function of 
input tariffs. Corden (1971) also summarizes NRP and ERP
relationships. For instance, if the nominal rate of the input is 
equal to the nominal rate of the output, then the output's effective
rate will also be equal to its own nominal rate. Also, there is a
direct relationship between the nominal and effective rates of output 
and nominal and effective rates of inputs. It is also possible that 
the effective rate can be negative even though the nominal rate is
positive. And if there is no nominal tariff on output but there is a
tariff on inputs, then the effective rate is also negative. In short, 
ERP’s change in response to changes in nominal rates of both output 
and inputs.
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2.4 Domestic Resource Cost
Bruno (1962 and 1972) defined DRC as a concept which relates to
the real opportunity cost in terms of total domestic resources of
producing (or saving) a net marginal unit of foreign exchange. This
is more relevant in developing countries because markets are distorted
and resources like foreign exchange are constraining. DRC can be
used to measure social cost of protection, the valuation of domestic
resources needs to be in terms of shadow prices to reflect social
opportunity cost of using them. This approach has been discussed
thoroughly by Bruno (1962), Krueger (1966), Balassa (1968) , and
*
Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1978) in the context of the cost of using 
real resources including foreign exchange in the drive of certain 
countries to expand production.
The use of the DRC criterion has increased after criticisms 
of ERP as an investment criterion because of problems in prediction 
of resource allocation effects. The ratio of opportunity costs of 
alternative uses between outputs is given the term "shadow price" 
which can be thought of as the marginal rate of substitution between 
the "outputs" in question - the amount of one output which has to be 
sacrificed to obtain another output (Dasgupta and Pearce, 1978). An 
examination of the DRC criterion shows that, (1) tradable goods are 
valued at world (or border)prices, and preferably (2) domestic factors 
are valued at their second-best distortion-reflecting shadow prices 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1980). Valuation of tradable and
primary factors at their shadow prices or opportunity costs
18
are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
This calculation of the shadow price however, is less than 
general because it is based on a partial equilibrium analysis that is 
valid only for relatively small changes in the economic structure. 
However, this can be "generalized" by conventionally defining it as 
the net contribution of a marginal unit to the national product. 
Modifications are made by evaluating the domestic resource cost 
coefficient at the opportunity cost of using foreign exchange 
(Chenery, 1961; Bruno, 1962, and; Krueger, 1966).
There is another advantage of using DRC. In the absence of 
better industry information, sensitivity criteria suitable for use in 
DRC approach can be used. Sensitivity analysis evaluates the change 
of the DRC coefficient from corresponding changes in costs of inputs 
or yields of the productive activity.
It has however, been criticised on the ground that its original 
use (as Bruno and Krueger did it) treats all domestically produced 
inputs as non-tradable. In Balassa and Schydlowsky's (1968) view, 
the Bruno-Krueger system penalizes intermediate input-using industries 
by valuing domestically produced intermediate inputs at domestic 
prices. Most often, these inputs can be imported at far less cost. 
Hence, costing inputs at domestic prices can give estimates of DRC 
that are biased upwards. Other limitations of the DRC approach are 
discussed in Warr (1983),
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The DRC approach also should evaluate the protective effects of 
policies at the margin since what is relevant to policy is output 
increments. Warr (1983) suggested that DRC can illustrate the degree 
to which commercial policy has distorted resource allocation by 
calculating DRC of foreign exchange saved in highly-protected 
import-competing production and contrasting this with the same measure 
for relatively unprotected export- or import-competing production. 
However, this is difficult in practice because often there is no 
information on marginal cost of production at aggregate levels. If we 
can assume that marginal and average costs of different industries 
tend to move proportionately, then average costs can be used as a
proxy for marginal costs. Then, DRC would illustrate the differential 
nature of incentives as indicated by the differential social returns 
from the allocation of resources in producing different products.
2.5 Empirical Applications in Agriculture
The application of these approaches to the Philippines 
rice industry was done in research coordinated by the Food
Research Institute of the Stanford University as part of the 
project on the study of the political economy of rice in
Asia (Pearson, et al., 1976). Based on the definition of 
comparative advantage in Section 2.1, Pearson et al, distinguished 
social from private profitability of rice production. Pearson 
et al argued that whereas an individual firm makes its decisions on the 
basis of market prices for its inputs and outputs, governments acting in 
the interest of the whole society should make its decisions on the basis
20
of social prices of inputs and outputs. This requires the evaluation 
of net social profitability (NSP - defined as the net gain or loss 
associated with an economic activity evaluated using shadow prices) 
which can differ from private profitability. In social profitability 
calculations, all variables are evaluated at their opportunity cost, 
recognizing that there are basic market distortions.
The relationship between NSP and comparative advantage is
straightforward. A country or region in a country has a comparative 
advantage in producing a commodity if the NSP of the activity is 
positive.
Using sensitivity analysis, Pearson, et.al. (1976) measured the 
extent to which DRC tends to change with changes in the cost of 
labour, in yields and world prices. Such results can give useful
policy guidelines. However, their work covered a single year only. 
As Ahn (1982) showed, comparative advantage changes over time and a 
snap-shot analysis would be a poor indicator of relative efficiency 
from which investment decisions could be made. A knowledge of 
long-term trends of variables like prices is necessary. Given 
volatile world prices, this is often difficult to ascertain, but 
the long-term trends in DRC changes are more useful for investment 
appraisal.
The other weakness of the study was the use of averages rather 
than marginal figures in the analysis. There is an analtyical 
conflict between theory and empirical estimates of DRC because data on 
marginal products and marginal costs are difficult to obtain. Hence, 
great caution must be used in interpreting coefficients of DRC based
21
on average to draw resource reallocation implications.
The study by Herdt and Lacsina (1976) on the Philippine rice 
industry emphasized that differences in technology used in 
production of rice explain the differences in relative efficiency 
between regions. Two limitations of this study, in addition to 
the above were: (1) the use of prices significantly higher than
support and actual prices, both in domestic and world terms, and 
(2) the assumption that the Philippine peso was only slightly 
overvalued. A study using input-output data of 1974 found the 
peso to be 34 percent overvalued (Medalla, 1979) while Herdt and 
Lacsina used a figure of five per cent. In general, 1974 was a 
year with record world rice prices and measures based on those 
prices are likely to underestimate the degree of comparative 
advantage that may actually exist.
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Chapter 3
Impact of Government Intervention on the Rice Industry
3.1 Pattern of Protection in the Philippines Rice Industry
The Philippines has adopted various policies which affected the 
rice industry both directly and indirectly through various forms of
intervention. Both input and output prices of rice and most
agricultural crops increased faster than those of the manufacturing sector 
between 1960 and 1974 (ILO, 1976). However, the incentive structure 
of government policy was effectively biased against the agricultural 
sector in 1965 (Power in Balassa, 1971). This was due to higher input
prices, and trade taxes (e.g., export tax, export quota, and other
levies) on traditional agricultural exports including sugar (David, 
1982). Since low consumer prices tended to dominate the objective of 
food price policy, the government was expected to intervene in input 
markets in order to offset the former to maintain producer incentives. 
Gravity irrigation and rural institutional credit were subsidized. 
Although fertilizer was supposedly subsidized to farmers through the 
Masagana-99 Program (a scheme for increasing rice production), there 
appears to have been no actual subsidy between 1976 and 1981 (David, 
1982). This happened because the government was also acting to 
protect the domestic manufacturing of fertilizer. Thus, while a 
subsidy was given to the fertilizer producers who were also importers, 
domestic prices were set at quite high levels.
23
The effects of policies on several industries in the economy are 
briefly summarized in the pattern of protection costs in the Philippines 
(Table 3.1). Protection of the manufacturing sector diminished in
1968 and 1974 in comparison with 1965 but many agricultural industries 
actually experienced negative nominal protection and small effective 
rates of protection between 1968 and 1974. Thus, the situation in the 
Philippines was biased against many agricultural industries including 
rice .
3.2 Trends in Rice Production and Productivity
Inspite of the developments discussed above, the rice industry 
has experienced high growth rates. Paddy production has expanded from 
about 5.2 million tons in 1969 to 8.1 million tons in 1981 (Table 
3.2). This is an average annual growth rate of 4.58 percent between
1969 and 1981.
Continued growth in rice output is considered to be necessary to 
meet the expanding demand caused by growth of population and incomes.
There are at least five factors that can help increase production, 
namely:
(1) expansion of harvested area under cultivation,
(2) expansion of irrigation systems,
(3) planting of HYV’s,
(4) increased use of fertilizer and other chemicals,
(5) the improvement of milling technology, and
(6) extension services.
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Until about 1960, growth in rice production was based primarily 
on an increase in the physical areas of land under cultivation, with 
relatively little change in technology and total factor productivity 
(Crisostomo and Barker, 1972). Between 1949 and 1959 growth in 
total inputs was greater than the rate of growth of total output, with 
land and labour dominating (Table 3.3). The increasing scarcity of 
arable land suitable for rice cultivation left fewer ways from which 
production could be increased at the beginning of the 1960's. Figures 
show that the area harvested to rice has remained relatively constant 
at an average of above 3.2 million hectares for quite some time now. 
Between 1958/59 and 1977/78, area harvested had grown only by 0.4 percent 
per annum (Onkingco, et al., 1982). The conscious effort towards land 
intensive strategies brought about by the limited land availability 
resulted in enormous technological change in rice production in the 
1970's. This reversed the dependence on land expansion as the primary 
means of stimulating growth. Starting in the late 1960's output 
significantly increased as a result of the use of new technology.
The improvements in production and yield thereafter have been 
brought about by intensified land use with the help of irrigation, and 
the use of HYV’S and fertilizer. In an estimate of the impact of 
irrigation on yield, a study at IKRI using microlevel production function 
analysis showed that irrigation was very significant (Table 3.4). On 
average, 50 percent of yield increases can be attributed to the use of 
irrigation by allowing a second crop to be cultivated during the dry 
season. Casiple-Rola (1979) showed that productivity returns were 
high for investments in irrigation even at interest rates of 25 per cent.
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Between 1965/66 and 1980/81, the irrigated paddy area 
increased by 4.7 percent annually. In 1980/81, area irrigated was 47 
percent of total harvested area used in rice production.
In 1966, the first of the HYV1s were introduced. Based on the 
above IRRI study, an average of 30 percent of yield increases was 
attributed to the use of HYV's and adoption spread rapidly. In 
1978/79 over 80 percent of the total rice area was planted to HYV’s 
(Table 3.5).
The use of HYV’s was correlated with an increase in fertilizer 
use. There is no available information on the breakdown of fertilizer 
consumption by commodity in the Philippines. However, the Fertilizer 
and Pesticide Authority (FPA) estimated in 1968/69 that 30 percent of 
all fertilizers and nutrients was applied to rice. Based on this, an
IRRI studyr which used the constant factor shares method , estimated that
fertilizer applied to rice would have increased from 46.9 kilograms in 
1969/70 to 68.4 kilograms per hectare in 1978/79 (Ongkingco, et.al., 
1982). Furthermore, nitrogen use in kilograms per hectare would have 
increased from 11.2 in 1969/70 to 17.8 in 1978/79. This is still 
below the recommended amount of 64.5 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1981).
Achievement of the best results from HYV's requires adequate 
water control, careful attention to the timing of operations, improved 
farming practices including the control of weeds, pests and diseases, 
and the application of the appropriate type and quantity of 
fertilizer. Hence, the role of government policy became more
30
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important because the adoption of these practices on a large scale 
depended in turn on the development of an effective, well-managed 
extension program. Studies have shown that the Filipino farmer has 
acquired substantial technical knowledge on the use of inputs like 
fertilizer and seeds of HYV’s , though many recommendations were not 
followed because of input constraints (Alviar, et.al., 1978).
Improvements in milling recovery, while smaller in its 
contributions to output expansion, still seem significant. Higher 
growth rates of rice production in milled equivalent over that of 
paddy production have been recorded. In 1969/70, the milling rate was 
60 percent of a given unit weight of paddy but in 1981/82, this had 
improved to 65.4 percent. Some authors suggested that the use of 
"cono" mills instead of "kiskisan" mills was one of the contributing 
factors to this increase (Hears, 1974, and; Deomampo and Sardido, 
1979). However, a high proportion of broken rice still exists in the 
present milling systems (Unnevehr, 1982). The apparent increases in 
rice production could be partly due to a greater acceptance of broken 
rice because the Filipino consumer is less concerned about broken 
grains than aroma and variety. On the other hand, better quality is 
important in world markets.
32
3.3 Impact of Intervention on Domestic and International Trade
The desire of the government to provide remunerative rice prices 
to producers is reflected in the floor price schemes that were set up. 
Prior to 1975, farm gate paddy prices were higher than support prices. 
These differences were attributed to low domestic supplies and 
inadequate imports (Unnevehr, 1982). After 1975, as supplies 
increased, farm gate prices have tended to be lower than official 
government prices. Retail prices prior to 1978 were higher than 
official ceiling prices (Table 3.6). Since then the situation has 
been reversed.
The success of interventions made in defence of the regulated 
prices ultimately depended on international trade, since any deficit 
was supplied through imports and any surplus disposed of through 
exports. During the importing years, imports were subsidized whenever 
the world price was higher than the official ceiling price, see Table 
3.6. Since the Philippines became a net rice exporter starting in 
1977, exports were subsidized by the government to maintain prices 
favourable to producers. A wedge between domestic and international 
prices was created. Between 1978 and 1981, farm gate prices received 
by farmers increased more than between 1973 and 1977, but in real 
terms they have declined due to inflation.
Successful implementation of price policies affecting producers 
was initially limited because government paddy procurement was small. 
The National Food Authority (NFA) was mandated to purchase up to 10 
percent of the marketable surplus per annum. But procurements were
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below this target up to 1976 because producers preferred to sell to 
private traders (Table 3.7). The prices that the government was 
willing to pay producers were lower than prices offered by private 
traders. The mandate permitted the licensing of private warehouse 
owners and millers involved in various business operations except 
retailing. The procurement levels after 1976 exceeded the target, 
presumably because of increased supply and the new directives which 
increased official floor prices to a point above open market farm 
prices. However, in 1980/81, NFA purchases declined although it was 
still higher than the target, at 10.58 percent of the marketable 
surplus.
The inclusion of licensed private warehouse owners and millers as 
NFA agents in government domestic trade may have resulted in producers 
being paid lower purchase prices. The government has not removed 
sufficient supplies from the domestic market to maintain floor prices 
(Unnevehr, 1982). The collapse of effective farm gate prices was 
probably one of the reasons that the government directed NFA to buy 
765,000 metric tons or 15 percent of the estimated marketable surplus 
of 5.1 million metric tons of paddy in 1982. Whether this, together 
with the new government directive in early 1983 to remove possible 
impediments to exports of rice, will prove to be more effective in 
enforcing floor prices is yet to be seen.
35
Table 3.7* Government paddy procurement, 1973 to 1981
Y e a r : Marketed: Surplus ;
Procurement •
•
Percent
Procurement of 
Marketed Surpli
('0 0 0 m ei t r i c t 0 n s )
1973 : 3529 • 63.33 1.79
1974 s • - -
1975 ! 3763 • 201.00 5.34
1976 : 4041 • 268.10 6.63
1977 : 4116 : 634.10 15.14
1978 i 4283 • 513.40 II.98
1979 i 4670 0 7 5 6 .8 0 1 6 .2 0
I960 i 4587 0 485.40 IO.58
1981 : - • 58 0 .6 0 -
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Philippines.
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3.4 Rice Exports of the Philippines
The country's rice exports are differentiated into two major 
groups based on use, namely: (1) non-glutinous rice, wholly-milled or
semi-milled which is either polished, glazed or unpolished, for food 
purposes, and (2) non-glutinous rice in the husk for propagation 
purposes. The Philippines which became a net rice exporter only in 
1977 has actually been a net exporter of rice for seed purposes as 
early as 1971 involving 7.3 tons and increasing to 20,000 tons in 1981 
or an equivalent of 40,000 per year over the whole period (JSIFA, 1982). 
These exports attracted relatively higher prices, the highest of which 
was U.S.$424 per ton in 1980 (Table 3.8). Most of the deliveries went 
to various Asian nations, two countries in Africa (Egypt and Malagasy 
Republic) and even the United States of America.
In contrast, exports of rice for food purposes started only in 
1977. The country's initial exports involved 4,200 metric tons to 
Indonesia. Indonesia, which is located near the Philippine 
archipelago has been the primary buyer of the country’s rice exports.
In 1980 alone, total deliveries involved 91,466 metric tons of rice 
valued at U.S.$26.9 million (NFA 1982), Indonesia has been the consistent 
buyer of low grade rice with 35 percent broken grains (Soombonsup, 
1975). The Philippines, which produces rice with 25 to 45 percent 
broken grains because of inferior milling technology, is one of the 
suppliers of this low grade rice. Philippine f.o.b. prices for 35 
percent broken quality rice are as, if not more, attractive than world 
(Thai) prices of the same quality. The highest price received by
37
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exports so far is U.S.$314 per ton in 1981.
The repercussions of continued government control on exports tend 
to insulate the domestic market from world demand for quality. The 
domestic milling industry has no incentive to become competitive in 
higher quality international markets. The problem is magnified when 
markets like those of Indonesia and other Asian countries like Vietnam 
which are capable of increasing output, dry up. This has already 
happened twice in 1981 and 1982, when Indonesia’s imports dropped 
sharply because of bumper harvests. Therefore, a closer integration 
of the domestic and international markets, promoted by allowing 
private exports of rice or improving milling standards of NFA in line 
with its export promotion mandate may be required to make Philippine 
rice competitive in the higher quality markets. This may help to 
reduce the payouts for premiums of P0.07 per kilogram of export 
quality paddy sold by farmers to NFA. Also, export subsidies which 
are partly spent subsidizing the costs of separating and grading to 
meet the quality standards of some overseas buyers can be reduced 
(Central Bank of the Philippines, 1981). Otherwise, the increased 
subsidy costs (in the order of over P44 million between 1977 and 1981) 
brought about by the difference between domestic and export prices, 
could increase -
An examination of the Philippine rice balance sheet between 1977 
and 1981 indicates that exports declined to 95,000 metric tons in 
1981/82 (Table 3.9). This is equivalent to 7 per cent of domestic stocks 
ending 1981/82. Prior to this, the highest ever recorded delivery was
39
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in 1980/81 at 256,000 metric tons or 18 percent of reserves.
As a new rice exporter, the Philippines’ capacity to export would 
depend on increasing production and inventories, as maintaining 
domestic supplies still dominates government policy. A substantial 
stock in 1979/80 helped to increase exports in 1980/81, especially to 
Indonesia whose production declined during this year. The increase in 
exports reduced inventories in 1980/81 and this problem was aggravated 
by a reduction of domestic production of 58,000 metric tons compared to 
1979/80. Thus, in 1981/82 exports declined.
Philippines as a small rice exporter is a price taker in the 
world market. However, government policies have affected peso prices 
of exports by overvaluing the peso, and have made Philippine rice (and 
other) exports more expensive and less competitive in the world 
market. High levels of domestic inflation during the 1970's and 
towards the 1980's have tended to further reduce the competitiveness 
of exports. The improvement in quality of rice exports, and a more 
realistic exchange rate are likely to provide a stimulus to export.
In the recent period, the peso has. been allowed to depreciate 
substantially and in June, 1983 was devalued by a further 7 percent.
Reports indicate that a poor harvest due to adverse weather may 
result in there being no exportable surplus in 1983. This again 
demonstrates the fact that the Philippines is at present only a 
marginal rice exporter. Continuing substantial investment in 
irrigation is required to even maintain self-sufficiency (Herdt,
41
1982) and a major policy issue is whether such investment is
economically desirable.
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Chapter 4
Measuring the Impact of Government Policies on the 
Use of Resources by the Rice Industry
In this chapter the analytical measures discussed in Chapter 2 
will be described and the computational methods used in the study are 
presented.
4.1 Nominal and Effective Protection
The concept of the nominal rate of protection (NRP) is used to 
estimate the degree to which trade tax policies distort nominal 
output prices relative to those which would exist under a free trade 
situation. In algebraic form, it is defined by
NRP -
3
P
P
D
B
NRPj ~P j____P^_. where, i.e. A nominal prices
pB
is the nominal rate of protection on the jth 
commodity
is the domestic price of commodity j, and 
is the border price of commodity j
The above equation can be used to measure output price distortions. 
It can be also used to measure tradable input price distortions,
but the ERP concept is usually preferred.
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The effective rate of protection is analytically a more useful 
concept for assessing the effects of protecting an industry. There 
are three crucial assumptions used in deriving the ERP (Corden, 1971). 
First, there is a fixed physical input coefficient in domestic rice 
production which implies constant costs and zero elasticity of 
substitution among inputs. Secondly, there is the small open economy 
assumption, implying that foreign supply elasticities for all inputs 
and outputs are infinite. And thirdly, trade remains even after 
the imposition of tariffs. The above assumptions greatly facilitate 
the investigation of problems by allowing a framework for partial 
equilibrium analysis.
The effective rate of protection is defined by first letting the 
unprotected or free trade production values to be: (following Corden,
1971)
= Zxijp! + SxkjpkB .............. (1)
where,
1 — world market price of output is unity 
xrr amount of physical inputs i per unit of 
output j
amount of primary inputs k used per unit 
of output j
g
p^- world (border) market price of physical input i 
pj^ - world market price of primary input k
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On the other hand, let the protected or actual production values be:
1 + tj= E x jP® (i + t p  + Zxk .p® (2)
where,
t - is the proportion by which domestic market 
prices exceed world market prices due to 
tariffs and other protective instruments 
It is assumed in the analysis that while products and 
material inputs are traded, primary inputs are not, therefore, the 
world market price of outputs and material inputs are increased by 
the amount equal to t while leaving the world price of primary 
inputs unaffected thus,
Let x pij i
B
a .... value of tradable (material) inputsij
x p = a .... value of primary (factor) inputskj k kj
Substituting these in (1) and (2), we get,
1 = Za. . + Za1D kj
1 + t = Za. . (1 + t .) + Za, .D 13 i k j
(3)
(4)
And setting (3) equals v. as the value-added per unit of
commodity j at world prices, and 
1
(4) equals v. as the value-added per unit of 
commodity j at domestic prices, then
v .= 1 -Za . .
D ID
and v'.= (l + t ) - Z a  (1 + t )D j ij i
(5)
(6)
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Now, let E be defined as the effective rate of protection:
commodity j such that,
E.=v. - v. .............  (7): — i----- t ~
v.D
Thus, algebraically:
E =[(l+t.) - Za..(1+t.)] - [1-Za. ,] ............ (8)
[1-Za ]ij
=l+t.- Za. . - Za. ,t, - 1 + za---1---- ar)-----r-rt---------- ±j~
1_Zaij
= t, - za. . t. or t. - t.za .
“ 3------^  *-?-----3--- T-j-
1-Za. . 1 - Zai: ij
or t. + Za, . (t - t) ............ (9)j "~rj j t
1 - Za. .ID
where ,
t = Za t /Za - the weighted average tariff rateD ij i ij
on inputs of commodities into
the jth industry. [In this study,
the average of tariffs is drawn
from Herdt and Lacsina (1976).]
on
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4.2 Domestic Resource Cost
The DRC concept was discussed in Chapter 2. Here, the domestic 
resources considered are the values of labour, land, capital, and 
non-tradable inputs. These values are taken at second-best shadow 
prices. Leaving value-added in the same world prices as those used in 
estimating ERP, the domestic resource cost per unit of foreign 
exchange earned or saved through the jth industry becomes the ratio : 
(following U.N., 1972, and; Islam, 1980)
Value of labour + land + interest + cost of 
using capital + non-traded goods 
Output in world prices - domestic tradable 
inputs in world prices - imports 
where,
a - the multiplier used in converting the 
official exchange rate (OER) into its 
shadow exchange rate 
k - the official exchange rate 
The above expression can be rewritten as follows:
Value of labour + land + interest + cost of 
using capital + non-traded goods 
Output in world prices - domestic tradable 
inputs in world prices - imports
The denominator is expressed in world (or border) prices at the ruling
<
- ak
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exchange rate. The calculated DRC in the above formulation gives the 
social opportunity cost necessary to earn (save) a net marginal unit 
of foreign exchange through the jth industry. In other words, for 
optimal domestic resource allocation, industry j should be expanded, 
remain as it is, or be contracted if DRC of industry j is less than, 
equal to, or greater than one.
The use of DRC is premised on four assumptions. These are 
(1) the world price of product j is given exogenously, (2) the 
incremental costs of production are determined by a given technology 
and a set of relative factor prices assumed to be constant, (3) 
elasticity of input substitution is zero, and (4) shadow prices of 
outputs, inputs, and foreign exchange can be calculated. Assumptions 
numbers (2) and (3) emphasize the static, partial equilibrium nature 
of DRC (like ERP) and emphasize that comparisons of DRC coefficients 
over time can only be made if input-output data are available on a 
time series basis or if production technology and growth patterns 
do not substantially alter input mixes and domestic factor costs.
Assumption (4) is crucial. Shadow prices of factors of 
production in this study are defined in terms of social opportunity 
costs of using the factors in their best alternative employment. These 
shadow prices apply to primary factors while shadow prices of tradable 
outputs and inputs are border prices. In addition non-tradable input costs
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are divided into tradable input costs and primary domestic costs.
4.3 Methodology
All the above measures are applied to input-output data on crop 
production obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture of the 
Philippines. The data were sorted, classified and subjected to a 
disaggreated analysis. This analysis was based on; (1) existing data 
of rice production surveyed by the Ministry, (2) the recommended rice 
technology through Masagana-99 Program, (3) irrigated versus rainfed 
conditions, (4) comparison of relative efficiency of production 
between rice, corn, and sugar, (5)changes of comparative advantage in 
rice production in a span of four years ending in 1981, and (6) 
sensitivity of relative efficiency of rice production to changes in 
costs of relevant variables.
In calculating NRP, ERP, and DRC, private and social costs are 
distinguished from each other, and differentiated between private and 
social profitability as follows:
(A) Private Profitability is calculated by letting, (following
Akrasanee and Wattananukit, 1976)
(1) Gross Domestic Price of Output = current price of
wholesale milled rice (or corn or sugar)
(2) Tradable Inputs at Actual Market Prices = material
component of tradable inputs like seed, fertilizer, 
chemicals, and the material component of non-
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tradable inputs like irrigation, and processing and 
transportation. The method of calculating these costs 
follows Herdt and Lacsina (1976)
(3) Value-Added in Actual Prices = (1) - (2)
(4) Factor Costs Other Than Capital = primary costs of
labour, land (rents+payments made in kind for the use 
of land), unallocated cost or non-tradable component 
of the tradable inputs in (2)
(5) Private Profitability = (3) - (4); in practice,
indirect taxes are also deducted from (3) but 
there was no information on sales and excise taxes 
in rice production.
(B) Net Social Profitability is calculated by letting,
(6) Gross Border Price of Output = border (world) price of
milled rice, i.e., f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices during 
export and import years, respectively and border 
price of corn and sugar when appropriate
(7) Tradable Inputs at World Prices = material components
of tradable and non-tradable inputs valued at 
social opportunity cost or at prices at which inputs 
like seed and fertilizer can be exported or imported 
instead, respectively. The opportunity cost of 
fertilizer is equivalent to the average c.i.f. 
prices of urea, ammonium sulfate, and complete 
fertilizer, excluding social costs of domestic 
marketing and storage which are classified as
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non-tradables
(8) Value-Added in World Prices = (6) - (7); this is
equivalent to vj in equation 6 of section 4.1
(9) Domestic Resource Cost Other Than Capital = primary
costs of labour, land, and unallocated costs valued 
at social opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of 
labour (including family labour) is assumed to be 
equal to the average wage rate of hired labour. This 
assumption implies that the labour market is well- 
developed as it is considered to be in the Philippine 
context. The labour market is quite competitive 
especially in peak seasons and labour is quite 
mobile within production areas. The opportunity 
cost of using land is an imputed value based an 
the highest return from planting alternative crops. 
Social values of unallocated costs are assumed to 
be similar to actual private costs.
(10) Social Profitability = (8) - (9)
(11) Domestic Capital Cost = cost of using capital valued at
opportunity cost
(12) Net Social Profitability = (10) - (11) and valued at
OER
(13) Ratio of SPFX to OER = set at 1.34 in all calculations,
based on Medalla (1979)
(14) Net Social Profitability at SPFX = the product of the
value-added at world market prices and the
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ratio of SPFX to OER less all costs of domestic
resources used in rice production 
(C)Protection Coefficients And Domestic Resource Cost are
calculated by letting,
(15) Nominal Protective Coefficient on Output (NPCO) = ratio
of gross value of production in domestic prices to 
gross value of production at world prices per 
kilogram of rice
(16) Nominal Protective Coefficient on Input (NPCI) = ratio
of tradable inputs valued in domestic prices to 
tradable inputs at world prices
(17) Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) = ratio of
value-added in domestic prices to value-added at 
world prices
(18) Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) = ratio of all cost of
domestic resources to value-added at world prices
Since the border price has been defined as unity, calculation of 
NRP and ERP simply involves subtracting NPCO, NPCI, and EPC from the 
value of the border price. This can be further expressed in 
percentage terms by multiplying the difference by 100.
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Chapter 5
Comparative Advantage of Philippine Rice Production: 
Results and Discussion
The estimates of the impact of government policies on domestic 
rice production are discussed in this chapter. The analysis concerns 
issues relating to allocative decisions and hence to choice of 
technology.
Estimates of effective rates of protection (ERP's) are first 
discussed to give an overview of the present pattern of protection 
between rice, corn, and sugar production.
In the discussion, the technology that is followed by the farmers 
in irrigated systems is called the "average technology". The 
technology which is recommended by Masagana-99 Program is called the 
"recommended technology".
In the analysis, a comparison was made between these two 
technologies to derive implications for technology choice.
The relative economic performance of growing rice rather than 
other feasible crops was examined in the study. Likewise, the 
economics of the average technology under irrigated conditions with 
rice production in rainfed conditions was examined to determine 
converting rainfed into irrigated rice areas would be desirable.
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5.1 Effective Rates of Protection, 1978 - 1981
The ERP's of rice, corn, and sugar production, computed on the 
basis of procedures described in Chapter 4, are given in Table 5.1.
The net effect of government intervention as reflected in the ERP 
estimates showed that rice as well as corn have enjoyed a small 
positive effective rate of protection, while sugar has had negative 
effective rate of protection in recent years. Based on these 
estimates, the net effect on welfare of government policies appears 
to have discriminated against sugar production while favouring rice 
and corn production. Comparing other estimates of ERP in previous 
years (see Table 3.1), rice and com have enjoyed small positive 
effective rates of protection which have remained relatively unchanged, 
though in the case of corn, its ERP in 1981 was lower than the ERP 
during the mid-sixties. The major change over this time period 
was in sugar which had a relatively high level of portection in 1965, 
but became negative in 1968, and remained negative (at a somewhat 
higher rate) in 1978.
Since manufacturing had continued to enjoy a relatively high 
level of protection throughout the whole period, the overall policies 
of the government have continued to be biased against agriculture in 
general. Within the agricultural sector, the discriminatory nature 
of government policies are analyzed in the next two sections based 
on the social profitability of rice, corn, and sugar production.
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5.2 Choice of Technology
The domestic resource cost (DRC) coefficients at the shadow price 
of foreign exchange (SPFX) of the average and recommended technology 
are given in Table 5.2. These estimates are consistently less than 
unity. These imply that both technologies appear to be relatively 
efficient and indicate that the nation has a natural comparative 
advantage in rice production for either technology.
While the actual values changed over the period 1979 and 1981, 
the DRC’s at SPFX of the recommended technology are consistently lower 
than the average technology. Examination of social profits at SPFX, 
the "net social profits" (NSP) also indicates that the recommended 
technology has a higher NSP than the average technology. But private 
profitability of the recommended technology is lower than the average 
technology by an average of P0.04 per kilogram of rice output.
These results imply that the majority of farmers have no 
incentive to change to the recommended technology despite its social 
desirability, and can help to explain why farmers are reluctant to 
fully adopt the recommended technology. This suggests that there may 
exist an economic argument for government intervention to eliminate 
the divergencies between private and social profitability. Such 
government intervention may lead to an increase in the net 
contribution of the rice industry to aggregate national output. 
However, the method of intervention will have to be carefully examined 
to ensure that its benefits would indeed be higher than potential 
costs. In this regard, it is likely that recent steps to deregulate
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the fertilizer industry may prove helpful. Already, domestic 
fertilizer prices have declined and are now closer to international 
prices .
5.3 Choice of Crop
5.3.1 Rainfed Rice, Corn, and Sugar Production
A comparison between rainfed rice, corn (shelled), and sugar
(centrifugal) production attempts to analyze the net effects of 
government policy. The importance of rice has been discussed in
Chapter 1, but corn and sugar are also important crops. Corn is the
staple food of about 20 percent of the population, is second in
importance to rice in terms of area cultivated and , is a major
component of the animal feed industry. Sugar is an important export 
crop, although the area it occupies is smaller. It has contributed 
around 25 percent of crop value-added annually, and as an export crop, 
on average it has accounted for 26 percent annually of total 
agricultural exports during the period 1955 to 1980.
The estimated profitability measures and DRC coefficients at SPFX 
of rainfed rice, corn, and sugar production are presented in Table 
5.3. The various estimates of profitability and relative efficiency 
in rainfed rice production change over time, but these indicate that 
the country has had a comparative advantage as the DRC coefficients at 
SPFX are less than one for each year.
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T ab le  5 *3 « P r i v a t e  and  s o c i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  p r o t e c t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  
and  d o m e s t i c  r e s o u r c e  c o s t  o f  r a i n f e d  r i c e  p r o d u c t i o n ,
1978 t o  1981
I t e m 1978
( p e s
R a i n f e d
1979
o s  p e
R ice  P r o d u c t i o n
1980 I9 8 I
r  k i l o g r a m )
P r i v a t e  P r o f i t a b i l i t y 0 .5 8 0.85 1.13 1.25
S o c i a l  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( a t  OER) 0 .2 2 0 .0 8 0.17 0.14
S o c i a l  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( a t  SPPX) O.87 0 .6 6 0 .7 8 O.89
NRPO Jo) 1 4 .0 0 6 .0 0 3 .0 0 1 .0 0
NRPI Jo) -I7 .O O - 2 3 .0 0 - 2 6 .0 0 - 1 7 .0 0
ERP Jo) -I4 .O O 11.00 8 .0 0 4 .0 0
DRG ( a t  OER) O.89 0.95 0.93 0 .9 4
DRG ( a t  SPFX) 0 . 66 0.71 O.69 0 .7 0
Y i e l d  (kg .  p e r  h e c t a r e ) : I650 1710 1615 1830
S o u rce :  B as ic  D a ta ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  P h i l i p p i n e s
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Corn (shelled) production does not appear to have any comparative 
advantage; in 1981, the DRC coefficient at SPFX is greater than one 
(Table 5.4). Corn production can improve its comparative advantage if 
attempts to raise yields by using modern (hybrid) varieties are 
successful, i.e., if yields are raised from one to three or four tons. 
While it is hazardous to draw firm conclusion from a single year 
figure, it must be noted that world corn prices in 1981 were 
substantially higher than in many previous years. Therefore, the 
conclusions that at current yield levels, corn is uneconomic can be 
rather strongly argued.
Meanwhile, estimates of NSP of sugar production in 1978 indicate 
a lower degree of comparative advantage compared with rice. The NSP 
is lower compared to 1978 NSP of rainfed rice production (Table 5.5). 
This means that sugar production in 1978 was less efficient than rice.
Further analysis of the three crops' private and social profits 
(see Tables 5.3 - 5.5) indicates that private and social profits 
of rainfed rice production are greater than from corn.
It may be noted that in some cases DRC and NSP give different 
rankings of the crops. This arises from weaknesses of the DRC 
criterion as an indicator of social profitability - in particular, 
this is due to the fact that as a ratio it is affected by how benefits 
and costs are defined. The DRC suffers from the problem of arbitrary 
reassignments of benefits as negative costs and costs as negative 
benefits. Generally, NSP is to be preferred over DRC as an investment
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Table 5*5 • Private and social profitability, protection coefficients, 
and domestic resource cost of sugar production, 1978
: Sugar Production
I t e m : 1978
(pesos per kilogram)
Private profitability 0.18
Social profitability (at OER) 0.27
Social Profitability (at SPPX) 0.59
NRPO (#) -14
NRPI {%) 0
ERP (°/o) -19
DRC (at OSR) 0.70
DRC (at SPPX) 0.53
Yield (kilograms) 4810
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines.
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criterion. For a discussion of this issue see Warr (1983) and Emerson
(1983) .
Assuming constant costs in sugar production and analyzing the 
sensitivity of NSP and DRC to changes in border prices indicates that 
while recent rather low border prices decrease NSP’s (DRC's increase) 
they continue to be positive. Border prices of recent years are still 
higher than the levels in 1978. In fact prices in 1978 were the 
lowest during the period from 1975 and 1983 (Table 5.6). Border 
prices have to drop below P850 (equivalent to U.S.$115) per ton before 
sugar production in the Philippines would lose its comparative 
advantage, i.e., NSP to become negative and DRC to exceed one 
(Appendix Figure 1). However, this is subject to the assumption of 
constant costs; if domestic costs have risen, the relevant border 
price would be higher.
5.3.2 Irrigated Rice, Corn, and Sugar Production
In this section we ignore the fixed cost of irrigation of 
irrigated rice production on the grounds that it is sunk capital. 
Then the estimates of DRC coefficients at SPFX are less than one 
during the period 1978 to 1981 (Table 5.7). The analysis indicates 
that in irrigated rice production, the Philippines has a comparative 
advantage.
Unfortunately, only limited comparisons with irrigated corn and 
sugar production can be made. The study did not have data available 
for irrigated corn and sugar production. Hence, comparisons are made
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Table 5«6. Border prices of (centrifugal) sugar, 1975 to 1983
Y e a r : U.S. Dollar
( P e r t
Pesoson)
1975 : 597 4444
1976 : 317 2351
1977 : 209 1544
1978 : 175 1292
1979 : 183 1381
1980 : 347 2747
1981 : 383 3142
1982a : 205 -
1983a : 271 -
3 /June only, Far Eastern Economic Review 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook, various issues
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T a b le  5*7 • P r i v a t e  and  s o c i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  p r o t e c t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  
and  d o m e s t ic  r e s o u r c e  c o s t  o f  i r r i g a t e d  r i c e  p r o d u c t i o n ,
1978 t o  1981
3 /I r r i g a t e d  R ice  P r o d u c t i o n
I t e m : 1978
: ( p e s
1979
o s  p
1980
e r  k  i
1981
l o g
P r i v a t e  P r o f i t a b i l i t y : 0 . 6 1 0 . 9 0 1.27 1 . 2 1
S o c i a l  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( a t  OER) : 0 .47 0 . 4 0 0 .6 5 0 .5 3
S o c i a l  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( a t  SPFX)
01—l•rH•• O. 98 1 .2 9 1 . 2  6
NRFO C/o) : - 1 4 . CO 6 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
NRPI (fo) : - 2 4 .OO - 1 6 . 0 0 - I 9 .OO - 1 3 .0 0
ERP ( / ) : - 1 2 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 0
DRG ( a t  OER) : 0 .7 5 O. 76 0 . 6 6 0 .7 5
DRC ( a t  SPFX) : O.56 0 .5 7 0 .A9 O.56
Y i e l d  (k g .  p e r  h e c t a r e ) : 2171 2750 2810 2935
3 »e x c l u d e s  f i x e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  
S o u rc e :  B as ic  B a t a ,  M i n i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  P h i l i p p i n e s
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with rainfed corn and sugar production. The relevant estimates for 
rainfed corn and sugar production were given in the previous section. 
It is noted that these figures probably underestimate the 
profitability and relative efficiency of these crops when grown under 
irrigated conditions.
Subject to these limitations, rice production appears to remain 
more profitable and efficient than corn production (in 1981) in 
irrigated areas. Both private profits and NSP's of rice production in 
irrigated areas are higher than those of sugar production in 1978. 
These imply that irrigated rice is unlikely to be replaced by these 
other crops, and that such replacement is not desirable from a social 
viewpoint.
5.4 Investments in Irrigation
In this section, the economics of investment in irrigation is 
analyzed. This focuses on converting existing rainfed rice areas into 
irrigated conditions. Here, fixed costs of irrigation which were 
ignored in the previous section, assume great importance.
The DRC’s of irrigated and rainfed rice production are given in 
Table 5.8. Even when the full costs of irrigation are included, the 
DRC's continued to be less than one. Further analysis indicates that 
private profit estimates in irrigated rice production are generally 
slightly greater (except in 1981) than the private profits in rainfed 
conditions. However, NSP's of irrigated rice production are lower 
than those of rainfed rice production, as a consequence of allowing
66
T
ab
le
 
5
.8
. 
P
ri
v
at
e 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
, 
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
 c
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
, 
an
d
do
m
es
ti
c 
re
so
u
rc
e 
co
st
 
o
f 
ir
ri
g
a
te
d
 a
nd
 r
ai
n
fe
d
 r
ic
e
 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
19
78
 
to
 
I9
8I
1---1 LTN O N 0 0 O f t - O 0
s CO CM rH C O 0 0 O O N c m
0 0's • • • • • • • • c o
• H 1—1 rH 0 0 1—1 c *vT O O rH
- p 1—1
0 1
x i 0 r O c— C O 0 0 O r O O N LTN
0 CO ✓ — X rH rH c— 0 0 O O N VO 1---1
Jh O N • • • • • • • • v o
f t r—1 s rH 0 0 r O VO C O O O 1—l
CM
X J CÖ 1
0
f t O N u LTN CO VO O O O LTN 1---1 O
c— C O O VO O O O O N c 1—1
• H O N t o • • • • • • • • c—
d 1---1 O O O VO r O r—1 O 0 1—1
f t 0 CM 1—1
1—1
CO • H C O CM c— O 0 0 O N VO 0
c LTN CM CO O 0 0 C O VO LTN
o n f t • • • • • • • ♦ VO
1—1 O O 0 ■sj- c— f t " 0 O rH
1---1 1—1 1---1
Fh 1 1
0
• • •  •
f t
O
rH 0 O N CM O N O 0 O LTN O
d CO rH r O O N O 0 • C O v o CM
ö O N O • • • • • O • • C O
0 1—l 1—1 O O 1---1 0 r H O O CM
• H 0 P O
- p 1
0 0
0 VO LTN O 0 0 LTN VO LTN
x J C O f t CM O O 0 0 t— LTN O N
0 O N • • • • • • • • VO
u rH 1---1 O 1---1 r O O N CM O O CM
f t 1---1
0
0
• H 0
f t O N O r H V O O 0 O t — U N LTN 0
r — O N CM O 0 O C O VO r O •H
x i O N • • • • • • • • VO - p
0 rH O O O VO VO VO O O CM r f
- p m 1---1 t o
CÖ 1 • H
t o u
• H C O c— !i"N O O O C O O VO Fh
u C— VO rH O O O 0 C O 00 •H
u O N • • • • • • • • CM
M rH O 0 O LTN LTN 1—1 0 CM f t
1 r H
I
1 0
r H
•  • • • •  • d
- P
• H
f t
gJ
x— X O
/ —x X
g
f t
f t
i n
f t
O
- P
- P - p 0
d c3 O
v—^ 0 0s jL,
- P a j x i
0 •H - p • p - p 0
r H • H •H 0 X
- p • H rH rH CD • H
r Q •H •H & f t
M d r Q rO
- p d Cj Sh 0
•H - p - P / ---N 0 0
•H •H / - N X ft x 3
0 f t f t f t f t d
u 0 0 f t f t + rH
f t u Fh O m t o 0
f t f t f t 0
0 - f t - p V— / •H
- p 1—i 1---1 v--- ' d d
d «5 d x i
> • H •H O M r—1
• H 0 0 ft ft ft 0 0 0
Fh 0 0 ft ft ft ft ft • Hft m i n ft ft ft ft ft > -<
67
S
ou
rc
e:
 
B
as
ic
 
D
at
a.
 
M
in
is
tr
y
 
of
 A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
, 
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
for the full cost of irrigation. These results imply that producers 
would be reluctant to shift from rainfed to irrigated rice production 
if they have to bear the full cost of irrigation. Furthermore, given 
that the social profitability of irrigating new areas appears to be 
declining and is very slight in any case, there appears to be grounds 
for a comprehensive examination of the government’s irrigation 
policies.
5.5 Sensitivity of Domestic Resource Cost Coefficients
World rice prices are very volatile and technological change can 
increase yields. Therefore, values and costs of production are 
subjected to a sensitivity analysis to account for changes in prices 
and yields. Elasticities of DRC’s are obtained by recalculating the 
DRC coefficients assuming a 20 percent increase in costs of some 
inputs. The elasticity is defined as the proportional change in the 
cost of the input under consideration divided by the proportional 
change in DRC coefficient.
Results are presented in Table 5.9. These indicate that 
generally increases in domestic resource cost or loss in relative 
efficiency in rice production were primarily caused by declining 
border prices, decreases in yields, and increasing cost of 
land, labour, and irrigation. For instance, a DRC elasticity 
for border price of -0.99 for average technology indicates that a 
0.99 percent increase in border prices is needed for improving relative 
efficiency by one percent. It is also quite sensitive to increases in
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social cost of irrigation with a DRC elasticity of 2.73. This means
that only 2.73 percent increase in the cost of irrigation is needed to 
reduce relative efficiency by one percent. Differences in sensitivity 
among the systems of production are also indicative of the (1) capital 
intensiveness of the Masagana - 99 technology and the (2) 
land-extensiveness and importance of irrigation cost in the irrigated 
production system compared with the rainfed system. The DRC of the 
rainfed system with respect to land is quite sensitive but this was 
not primarily due to its land-extensiveness but rather to the high 
returns obtainable from planting alternative crops. In contrast, DRC 
coefficients of all the systems are relatively insensitive to 
increases in the price of fertilizer and farm capital. For instance, 
using average technology, the cost of fertilizer has to increase by 
38.89 percent before there is a reduction in relative efficiency by 
one percent. This is because the proportion of these costs in the 
total cost structure is small (Appendix Table 6). [Farmers in the 
Philippines have not used the recommended high amounts of fertilizer. 
Therefore, their expenditures on this input were small.] These 
indicate that the country's comparative advantage is only marginally 
affected by changes in their input prices in the range examined.
The most important determinant of changes in comparative 
advantage appears to be the world price of rice. World prices of rice 
have been quite volatile in the past, though the long-term trend has 
been a decline in real terms (Palacpac, 1982). If the world price of 
rice were to drop below U.S.$222 per ton, at the margin the 
relative efficiency of rice production would disappear (Figure 1),
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Figure 1. Sensitivity of DRC to Changes in World Rice Prices
aborder price at which Philippine rice production would lose its
comparative advantage; equivalent to P1700 (or U.S.S222) per ton
^border price of rice in 1981
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5.6 Summary of Results
The Philippines appears to have enjoyed a natural comparative 
advantage in rice production during the period 1978 to 1981.
The official recommended technology has higher social
profitability, but the farmers' "average" technology has higher 
private profitability. Hence, farmers are not likely to shift to 
recommended technology in the absence of appropriate government 
intervention to offset this divergence between private and social 
profitability.
Converting rainfed rice lands to irrigated conditions appears 
to be marginally socially profitable. However, private benefits are 
lower than the additional private costs of irrigation and farmers 
are unlikely to have adequate incentive to bear the full cost of 
irrigation.
At current yields, corn is not competitive with rice in rainfed 
environments, though sugar may emerge as an important competitor, 
depending on world price movements. In already irrigated areas, rice 
appears to have high private as well as social profits.
The country's comparative advantage in rice production is 
relatively little affected by changes in fertilizer and capital 
prices, but is very sensitive to world rice prices and also to land, 
labour, and irrigation costs.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
In general, Philippine government policies have been biased 
against agriculture. However, attempts were made to revitalize the 
rice industry, particularly in the 1970’s.
Various policies evolved with the intention of achieving 
different, often conflicting, primary goals like low consumer prices, 
self-sufficiency, and maintenance of rural incomes.
Direct government intervention took place in many aspects of 
production and trade in the rice industry. The government monopolized 
foreign trade. It also adopted a "two-price" system in support of 
producers and consumers through floor price and ceiling price policies 
respectively. The government made some direct purchases from 
producers through the state marketing agency, the National Food 
Authority. However, this was usually inadequate to effectively 
maintain floor prices. It fairly successfully controlled consumer 
prices after 1978 when an exportable surplus began to emerge. In 
terms of farm inputs, the government subsidized credit and irrigation 
costs. Widespread use of these inputs together with fertilizer, 
chemicals, and seeds of modern rice varieties provided the basis for a 
major increase in production. Additional government support was 
provided through research and extension.
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In this study, analysis and evaluation focused on the assessment 
of the net effect of these government policies and on whether the 
country enjoyed a natural comparative advantage in rice production 
during the period 1978 to 1981. This analysis was extended to include 
competing crops, i.e., corn and sugar, in order to compare their 
relative merits. To measure the degree of comparative advantage, the 
study made use of measures of private profitability, net social 
profitability (NSP), and DRC. Effective rates of protection (ERP) 
were also calculated for these crops.
The net effect of government intervention as reflected in the ERP 
estimates showed that in the more recent years, rice as well as corn 
have enjoyed a small positive degree of protection. Meanwhile, sugar 
has had negative protection. Thus, in relative terms, the policies 
have descriminated against sugar production while favouring rice and 
corn production. Compared with ERP's in previous years, rice and corn 
enjoyed positive protection which has remained relatively unchanged, 
though in the case of corn, its ERP in 1981 was lower than the rate 
during the mid-sixties. The major change over time in this respect 
was seen in sugar production which had relatively high levels of 
protection in 1965, which became negative in 1968, and remained 
negative (at a somewhat higher rate) in 1978. Since manufacturing 
continued to enjoy a relatively high level of protection throughout 
the whole period, overall government policies have continued to be 
biased against agriculture in general.
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The results of the analysis confirmed that the Philippines had 
enjoyed a comparative advantage in rice production during the period 
studied. Various issues now become relevant for policy. For 
instance, whether the degree of comparative advantage could support a 
viable export industry and whether continuing large-scale investment 
in irrigation is justifiable become important. Likewise, issues 
pertaining to choice of technology and crop substitution are 
important.
In general, the degree of comparative advantage in rice was found 
to be very sensitive to changes in world rice prices. World rice 
prices have historically been very volatile. Since real world rice 
prices have tended to decline over time, the present degree of 
comparative advantage could be reduced in the future if this trend 
continues. Thus, policies affecting the rice export industry should 
take careful account of these possible future developments. At the 
margin, the Philippines should expand, maintain, or contract 
production when the change in world prices would cause DRC 
coefficients to be less than, equal to, or greater than one. When 
short-term fluctuations can change DRC, it is very important to 
consider the long-term trend in deciding policy.
In terms of irrigation investment, expanding the area under 
irrigation appears to be only marginally socially profitable. Again 
depending on world rice prices and costs, even this margin may 
disappear. Hence, the policy of increasing irrigation investment 
needs careful reappraisal. If farmers have to bear the full cost of
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irrigation, irrigated rice production will not be privately profitable 
to farmers. Thus, they may be reluctant to change from rainfed to 
irrigated rice production unless the government continues to subsidize 
irrigation costs or other measures are taken.
At current yields, corn production at the expense of rainfed or 
irrigated rice production does not appear to be profitable. Sugar may 
be more competitive but privately and socially, rice is still the most 
desirable crop to be grown. Prospects for world sugar prices do not 
appear very bright and Philippine export markets are under pressure 
from competing sugar exporting countries and increased domestic 
production in those countries. Hence, it is unlikely that this 
situation would change much in the near future.
At present, the recommended technology is socially more 
profitable than average farmer’s technology, though the former is 
privately less profitable. This probably explains why farmers are 
reluctant to adopt the full recommended technology package. Some form 
of government intervention may be desirable to eliminate these
N
divergencies between private and social profitability. However, such 
interventions should be carefully evaluated to ensure that their 
social costs are not greater than their benefits.
The recent deregulation of an important input industry 
fertilizer, is a welcome move, and would be of assistance, though its 
impact is not likely to be very substantial, as fertilizer costs will 
have to change by very large amounts to make an appreciable change in 
DRC.
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Finally, it is important to recognize that technical change has 
been an important factor which enabled the Philippines to retain a 
comparative advantage in rice production during the period considered. 
Continuing technical change would be crucial to sustain this 
advantage. Investment in research which increased yields have been 
shown to have a high pay off, and this may be an area for more 
government attention.
In concluding this chapter and the whole study, despite the 
aggregate nature of industry information, a better understanding has 
been achieved of the impact of government intervention on the 
country’s comparative advantage of producing rice, corn, and sugar. 
However, the study suffers from a set of limitations. Some of the 
methodological weaknesses of the various measures used to analyze the 
degree of comparative advantage were reviewed in Chapter 2. Other 
major limitations arise from the data which were available for this 
study. Primarily, the data available for competing crops were 
inadequate. Of the competing crops, only corn and sugar production 
could be considered. Even then, data for these two crops were 
available only for a single year for rainfed conditions. Even for 
rice, only aggregate data for the entire country were available. 
Regional and more disaggregated data, particularly for different 
agro-climatic environments would have enabled analysis to concentrate 
on the "marginal" areas.
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However, the major implications drawn in this study appear to be 
sufficiently strong to warrant further research into reappraising some 
major policy areas such as the strategy of increasing production 
through large-scale irrigation investment and the importance of 
investment in technological change. Finally, the determination of the 
pattern of comparative advantage would have been more meaningful if 
analysis could cover more major industries in the economy.
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Table 1. Cost and Returns of Rice Production, 1976 to 1981
Average Technology Recommended Technology
1. Gross Output at 
Actual Market Prices
2. Tradable Inputs at 
Actual Market Prices
3. Value-Added (1 - 2)
4. Factor Cost Other Than 
Capital, Market Prices
5. Private Profitability
(3 - 4)
6. Gross Output at World 
Market Prices
7. Tradable Inputs at 
World Market Prices
8. Value-Added (6 - 7)
9. Domestic Resource Cost 
Other Than Capital
10. Social Profits (8 - 9)
11. Domestic Capital at 
Opportunity Cost
12. Net Social Profits 
at OER (10 - 11)
13. Ratio of SPFX to OER
14. Net Social Profits 
at SPFX (8x13-9+11)
15. NPCO (1/6)
16. NPCI (2/7)
17. EPC (3/8)
18. DRC (9+11/8)
19. Ratio of DRC to 
SPFX/OER (18/13)
20. Yield (kg./hectare)
21. Milling Ratio
1978 1979 1980 1981
(pesos
1.96 2.14 2.29 2.61
0.31 0.27 0.26 0.35
1.65 1.87 2.03 2.26
1.04 0.97 0.76 1.05
0.61 0.90 1.27 1.21
2.28 2.02 2.22 2.57
0.50 0.44 0.45 0.55
1.78 1.58 1.77 2.02
1.56 1.48 1.47 1.90
0.22 0.10 0.30 0.12
0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
0.12 -0.01 0.19 0.01
1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
0.72 0.52 0.90 0.69
0.86 1.06 1.03 1.01
0.58 0.61 0.57 0.63
0.97 1.18 1.14 1.12
0.93 1.006 0.89 0.99
0.Ä9 0.75 0.66 0.74
2171 2750 2810 2935
1.55 1.54 1.53 1.53
: 1976 1979
er kilogram) 
: 1.99 2.14
1980
2.29
1981
2.61
: 0.16 0.27 0.27 0.35
: 1.83 1.87 2.02 2.26
: 0.70 0.88 0.87 1.12
: 1.13 0.99 1.15 1.14
: 1.66 2.02 2.22 2.57
: 0.29 0.39 0.43 0.51
: 1.37 1.63 1.79 2.06
: 1.01 1.27 1.39 1.52
: 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.54
: 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07
: 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.47
: 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
: 0.79 0.84 0.94 1.17
: 1.19 1.06 1.03 1.01
: 0.55 0.69 0.63 0.68
: 1.33 1.15 1.13 1.10
: 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.77
: 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.57
: 3650 3950 4000 4050
: 1.57 1.54 1.53 1.53
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Table 2. Cost and returns of irrigated rice production, 1978 - 1981
1. Gross Output at
Actual Market Prices
1978
1.96
2. Tradable Inputs at 
Actual Market Prices 0.31
3. Value-Added in Actual 
Market Prices (1 - 2) 1.65
4. Factor Cost Other Than 
Capital, Market Prices 1.04
5. Private Profitability 
(3 - 4)
0.61
6. Gross Output at World 
Market Prices 2.28
7. Tradable Inputs at 
World Market Prices 0.41
8. Value-Added in World 
Prices (6 - 7) 1.87
9. Domestic Resource Cost 
Other Than Capital 1.30
10. Social Profitability 
(8 - 9)
0.57
11. Domestic Capital at 
Opportunity Cost 0.10
12. Net Social Profits 
at OER (10 - 11) 0.47
13. Ratio of SPFX to OER 1.34
14. Net Social Profits 
at SPFX (8x13-9+11) 1.10
15. NPCO (1/6) 0.86
16. NPCI (2/7) 0.76
17. EPC (3/8) 0.88
18. DRC (9+11/8) 0.75
19. Ratio of DRC to 
SPFX/OER (18/13) 0.56
20. Yield
21. Milling Ratio
2171
1.55
1979 
(pesos 
2.14
1980
per kilogram) 
2.29
1981
2.61
0.27 0.26 0.35
1.87 2.03 2.26
0.97 0.76 1.05
0.90 1.27 1.21
2.02 2.22 2.57
0.32 0.32 0.41
1.70 1.90 2.16
1.19 1.14 1.52
0.51 0.76 0.64
0.11 0.11 0.11
0.40 0.65 0.53
1.34 1.34 1.34
0.98 1.29 1.26
1.06 1.03 1.01
0.84 0.81 0.87
1.10 1.07 1.05
0.76 0.66 0.75
0.57 0.49 0.56
2750
1.54
2810
1.53
2935
1.53
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Table 3. Cost and returns of irrigated and rainfed rice production
Irrigated Rainfed
1. Gross Output at
Actual Market Prices
1978
1.96
1979
2.14
1980 1981
(pesos 
2.29 2.61
: 1978 1979
per kilogram) 
1.96 2.14
1980
2.29
1981
2.61
2. Tradable Inputs at 
Actual Market Prices 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.31
3. Value-Added in Actual 
Market Prices (1 - 2) 1.67 1.89 2.04 2.26 1.66 1.90 2.06 2.30
4. Factor Cost Other Than 
Capital, Market Prices 1.00 0.99 0.78 1.07 1.08 1.05 0.93 1.05
5. Private Profitability 
(3 - 4)
0.67 0.90 1.26 1.19 0.58 0.85 1.13 1.25
6. Gross Output at World 
Market Prices 2.28 2.02 2.22 2.57 2.28 2.02 2.22 2.57
7. Tradable Inputs at 
World Market Prices 0.53 0.39 0.41 0.50 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.37
8. Value-Added in World 
Prices (6 - 7) 1.75 1.63 1.81 2.05 1.92 1.71 1.91 2.20
9. Domestic Resource Cost
Other Than Capital 1.80 1.21 1.26 1.64 1.60 1.49 1.63 1.92
10. Social Profitability 
(8 - 9)
-0.05 0.32 0.55 0.43 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.28
11. Domestic Capital at
Opportunity Cost 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.14
12. Net Social Profits
at OER (10 - 11) -0.14 0.21 0.44 0.32 0.22 0.08 0.17 0.14
13. Ratio of SPFX to OER 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
14. Net Social Profits
at SPFX (8x13-9+11) 0.45 0.76 1.05 0.99 0.87 0.66 0.78 0.89
15. NPC0 (1/6) 0.86 1.06 1.03 1.01 0.86 1.06 1.03 1.01
16. NPCI (2/7) 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.70 0.83 0.77 0.74 0.83
17. EPC (3/8) 0.95 1.16 1.12 1.10 0.86 1.11 1.08 1.04
18. DRC (9+11/8) 1.08 0.87 0.75 0.85 0.89 0.95 0.93 0.94
19. Ratio of DRC to
SPFX/OER (18/13) 0.80 0.65 0.56 0.64 0.66 0.71 0.69 0.70
20. Yield 2286 2635 2695 2820 1650 1710 1615 1830
21. Milling Ratio 1.55 1.54 1.53 1.53 1.54 1.53 1.53 1.53
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Table 4. Costs and returns of corn (shelled) production, 1975 and 1981
1975 1981 Maisagana Program, 1981
1. Gross Output at
Actual Market Prices 0.95
(pesos per kilogram) 
1.20 1.20
2. Tradable Inputs at 
Actual Market Prices 0.12 0.27 0.42
3. Value-Added in Actual 
Market Prices (1 - 2) 0.83 0.93 0.78
4. Factor Cost Other Than 
Capital, Market Prices 0.78 0.88 0.55
5. Private Profitability 
(3 - 4)
0.05 0.05 0.23
6. Gross Output at World 
Market Prices 1.00 1.11 1.11
7. Tradable Inputs at 
World Market Prices 0.12 0.27 0.42
8. Value-Added in World 
Prices (6 - 7) 0.88 0.84 0.69
9. Domestic Resource Cost 
Other Than Capital 1.22 1.13 0.62
10. Social Profitability 
(8 - 9)
-0.34 -0.29 0.07
11. Domestic Capital at 
Opportunity Cost 0.08 0.07 0.02
12. Net Social Profits 
at OER (10 - 11) -0.42 -0.36 0.05
13. Ratio of SPFX to OER 1.34 1.34 1.34
14. Net Social Profits 
at SPFX (8x13-9+11) -0.12 -0.07 0.28
15. NPCO (1/6) 0.95 1.08 1.08
16. NPCI (2/7) 1.00 1.00 1.00
17. EPC (3/8) 0.94 1.10 1.13
18. DRC (9+11/8) 1.47 1.42 0.92
19. Ratio of DRC to 
SPFX/OER (18/13) 1.09 1.06 0.69
20. Yield (kg. per hectare) 875 1060 3690
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Table 5. Costs and returns per ton of sugar (centrifugal) production,
1978
1. Gross Output at
Actual Market Prices 1115.68
2. Tradable Inputs at
Actual Market Prices 355.88
3. Value-Added in Actual
Market Prices ( 1 - 2 )  759.80
4. Factor Cost Other Than
Capital, Market Prices 437.23
5. Indirect Taxes 258.43
6. Private Profitability 178.80
( 3 - 4 - 5 )
7. Gross Output at World
Market Prices 1292.13
8. Tradable Inputs at
World Market Prices 355.88
9. Value-Added in World
Prices (7 - 8) 936.25
10. Domestic Resource Cost
Other Than Capital 634.74
11. Social Profitability 301.51
(9 - 10)
12. Domestic Capital at
Opportunity Cost 27.14
13. Net Social Profits
at 0ER (11 - 12) 274.37
14. Ratio of SPFX to OER 1.34
15. Net Social Profits
at SPFX (9x14-10+12) 592.69
16. NPC0 (1/7) 0.86
17. NPCI (2/8) 1.00
18. EPC (3/9) 0.81
19. DRC (10+12/9) 0.70
20. Ratio of DRC to
SPFX/OER (19/14) 0.53
21. Yield (tons per hectare) 4.81
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Table 6. Private and social cost of rice production using average 
technology, 1978 to 1981
Private Social
1978 1979 1980 1981 :
(pesos per
1978 1979
kilogram)
1980 1981
Primary Inputs
Labour 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.37
Land 0.10 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.47 0.60 0.71
Capital 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
Unallocated:
Irrigation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.45
Processing and
Transport 0.51 0.31 0.13 0.36 0.51 0.31 0.13 0.36
Tradable Inputs
Seeds 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Fertilizer 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.11
Chemicals 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06
Irrigation 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.17
Processing and
Transport 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.11
Source: Basic Data, Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines
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Table 7. Private and social cost of rice production using recommended 
technology, 1976 to 1981
Private Social
1976 1979 1980 1981 :
(pesos per
 1976 1979
kilogram)
1980 1981
Primary Inputs
Labour 0.36 0.38 0.54 0.57 0.36 0.38 0.54 0.57
Land 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.30 0.33 0.42 0.26
Capital 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07
Unallocated:
Irrigation 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.33
Processing and
Transport 0.14 0.31 0.14 0.36 0.14 0.31 0.14 0.36
Tradable Inputs
Seeds 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06
Fertilizer 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13
Chemicals 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08
Irrigation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12
Processing and
Transport 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.11
Source: Basic Data, Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines
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Table 8. Private and social cost of irrigated rice production, 
1978 to 1981
Private Social
1978 1979 1980 1981 : 1978 1979 1980 1981
(pesos per kilogram)
Primary Inputs
Labour 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.38
Land 0.09 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.47 0.55
Capital 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
Unallocated:
Irrigation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.54 0.27 0.32 0.35
Processing and 
Transport 0.31 0.31 0.13 0.36 0.51 0.31 0.13 0.36
Tradable Inputs
Seeds 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
Fertilizer 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12
Chemicals 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06
Irrigation 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.13
Processing and 
Transport 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.11
Source: Basic Data, Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines
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Table 9. Private and social cost of rainfed rice production, 
1978 to 1981
Private Social
1978 1979 1980 1981 : 1978 1979 1980 1981
(pesos per kilogram)
Primary Inputs
Labour 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.40
Land 0.15 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.66 0.76 1.05 1.14
Capital 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.14
Unallocated:
Irrigation - - - - - - - -
Processing and 
Transport 0.51 0.31 0.13 0.36 0.51 0.31 0.13 0.36
Tradable Inputs
Seeds 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12
Fertilizer 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.12
Chemicals 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Irrigation - - - - - - - -
Processing and 
Transport 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.11
Source: Basic Data, Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines
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